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Abstract
The new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has delegated more responsibility
to the data controllers, who are accountable for the way the data is processed. Thus,
in order to minimize the privacy risks, the controllers have to choose the best practices
and mechanisms to process data.
Since this risk analysis was not a competence of data controllers, it was the Data
Protection Authorities whom developed the risk analysis, the elaboration of this
analysis is a challenging task for the controllers, since there are neither established nor
professional methodologies with these competencies.
With this work, we intend to facilitate the elaboration of risk analysis and, if necessary,
the Data Protection Impact Assessments. In the first instance, describing the existing
technological solutions to express online consent in a positive fashion and offering a risk
proposal based on the linear combination of the rating of each one of these properties.
Then, by elaborating a semiautomatic assessment that measures the compliance of
information systems with the GDPR, from several yes/no questions that are weighted
according to the importance of the attribute in relation to the GPDR. In order to
elaborate the questions, a mapping of the regulation with ISO 27001 was carried
out, and the requirements of some regulatory authorities regarding the security and
protection of information systems were studied.
Finally, the agreement among several specialists in the definition of risk was calculated.
From the analysis, there is a low agreement between the observers, highlighting that it
is not easy to fulfill the requirements of the GDPR and showing that these studies are
important when performing a Data Protection Impact Assessment. To overcome the
low agreement, we propose the median of the observers’ rate.
keywords: GDPR; DPIA; data protection; privacy; consent; information security
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Resumo
O novo Regulamento Geral de Proteção de Dados (RGPD) delegou mais responsabili-
dade aos responsáveis pelo tratamento, sendo estes responsáveis pela forma de como os
dados são processados. Assim, para minimizar os riscos de privacidade, os responsáveis
devem escolher as melhores práticas e mecanismos para o processamento de dados.
Como essa análise de risco não era uma competência dos responsáveis, eram as
Autoridades de Proteção de Dados que efetuavam a análise de risco, a elaboração dessa
análise é hoje uma tarefa desafiadora para os responsáveis, uma vez que não existem
metodologias estabelecidas nem profissionais com essas competências.
Com este trabalho, pretende-se facilitar a elaboração das análises de risco e, se necessário,
as Avaliações de Impacto de Proteção de Dados. Descrevendo-se as soluções tecnológicas
existentes para expressar o consentimento online de forma positiva e apresenta-se uma
proposta de quantificação do risco.
Em seguida, apresenta-se uma avaliação semiautomática que calcula a conformidade
dos sistemas de informação com o RGPD, a partir de diversas questões de resposta
sim/não que são valorizadas de acordo com a importância do atributo em relação ao
RGPD. Para elaborar as questões foi realizado um mapeamento do regulamento com
a ISO 27001, e estudado os requisitos exigidos por algumas autoridades reguladoras
quanto à segurança e proteção dos sistemas de informação.
Por fim, calculou-se a concordância entre varios especialista na definição do risco. Da
análise, observa-se uma baixa concordância entre os observadores, destacando que não
é fácil cumprir os requisitos do RGPD, demostrando que estes estudos são importantes
para a realização de uma Avaliação de Impacto de Proteção de Dados. Para superar a
baixa concordância, propõe-se a mediana da classificação dos observadores.
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The private life of the individuals, more precisely, the knowledge and study of
their personal data is very valuable for States and organizations. Nevertheless, the
misapplication of this information might bring limitations to fundamental rights and
principles like freedom, equality and personal identity for the individuals.
In the recent years, we witnessed an exponential progression in all technological
areas, with special prevalence in computer systems. In parallel to the evolution of
online services, technological infrastructures have undergone major changes with the
improvement of network connectivity and hardware capabilities. This evolution has
been leading society to be more dependent on technology, including social networks,
e-commerce, information retrieval, the internet of things among others.
As a result of this technical development and subsequent increasing of data gathering
and sharing, there is a need to better protect individuals and their personal data. The
actions associated with the usage of applications, including the exchange of information
and personal data, can easily be accessible at the network level. Furthermore, during
these transactions, all personal data is being reused, linked and analyzed on an
unprecedented scale, challenging the privacy of the data subjects.
1.1 Motivation
Unfortunately, most of the personal data processing are not safe. When asked about
privacy, most of the individuals associate it with data breaches, social networks exposure
or targeted advertising.
10
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It was, consequently, in this environment, that the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) appeared, aiming to harmonize data privacy laws across Europe, in order to
protect and empower the privacy of all EU citizens and reshape the way organizations
approach data protection [10].
Therefore, the GDPR imposes some changes when processing personal data, requiring
the implementation of several measures, some of them already present in the previous
Directive, ranging from data collection, to its usage, storage, forwarding or sharing
and lastly to its destruction, promoting principles of transparency and accountability.
To that end, the organizations must be conscious of the impact that their personal
data processing has on the lives of data subjects, identifying and measuring the risks
of the data processing, and in some cases extended it to a Data Protection Impact
Assessment (DPIA).
Therefore, a DPIA helps to identify privacy issues at an early stage and reduce costs in
management time, legal expenses and potential media or public concern by detecting
potential risks arising from processing of Personal Identifiable Information (PII). So,
a DPIA can be used as an early warning system, informing an organization of the
precautions it should take and the tailored safeguards to be taken before further
expensive investments [29].
DPIAs, also, helps the organizations to demonstrate the compliance of the assessed
object with relevant privacy and data protection requirements [29].
1.2 Proposed Solution
With this work we aim to facilitate the compliance with the GDPR within the
organizations, especially regarding the preparation of DPIAs and respective measures
to be implemented to reduce the risk.
The term Risk Analysis, within the context of information security, can be understood
as the "process that identifies and assesses in a systematic, methodological and repeatable
manner the security risks to which the critical business resources of the organizations
are subject, enabling the definition of the means by which they can be protected".
Therefore, risk management allows to determine the precautions to take with regard
to the data nature and the risks of the processing, to preserve the data security, thus
protecting personal data requires taking "appropriate technical and organizational
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measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk" [article 32 of the
GDPR] [16, 19].
During the assessment of the privacy impact of processing personal data, all the
factors and actors involved in the processing must be counted, from the selection of
personal data processors, the forms available to data subjects exercise their rights, the
technologies used to process the data, among others.
Such approach allows for objective decision making and the determination of the
measures strictly necessary and suitable to the context. It is, however, often, difficult
when you are not familiar with those methods, to apply such an approach and to
ensure that the required measures have indeed been implemented [16].
Therefore, consent acquisition is one of the factors that influences the DPIA and one of
the factors that introduced several alterations to the normal work-flow of institutions.
In this thesis we enumerate and assess the existing mechanisms for consent acquisition
of data subjects to process their personal data. The purpose of this assessment was to
standardize and ensure consistency in DPIAs, and to facilitate the choice of method to
obtain consent from data subjects.
Also, in the preparation of the DPIAs it is essential to know the conditions in which the
digital data is handled and stored. So, an assessment of the Information Systems (ISs)
and the security and privacy measures implemented is also indispensable. Thus, in
this thesis, we also developed a semi-automatic DPIA for ISs, that semi-automatically
calculates the risk of using the system, according with the input given by the responsible
for the system suggesting some corrective measures to minimize the risk. The questions
were based on a mapping between GDPR and ISO/IEC 27001, and the security and
privacy requirements defined by AEPD and CNIL, two European Data Protection
Authorities (DPAs).
1.3 Related Work
During the elaboration of the thesis, some orientations and frameworks related to this
topic were studied, some of these orientations were already well established in society
as ISO 27001, but others were made available during the last year. In this section we
present some of the sources of information that guided us in the development of this
work and some similar platforms.
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1.3.1 GDPR Guidelines
During the period of adaptation to the GDPR, many entities provided guidance on
how organizations could adjust to comply with the regulation. One of the most active
entity was the Article 29 Working Party (Article 29 WP) [36], set up by the European
Commission at the time of Directive 95/46/EC. The Article 29 WP provided guidelines
on the most controversial and abstract issues of the GDPR, explaining in a more
concise way what was expected from the organizations to comply with the regulation.
Having presented, among others, guidelines on the consent request and how to carry
out a privacy impact assessment.
Data Protection Authorities (DPAs), in particular the CNIL, ICO. and AEPD, also
presented some guidelines to help controllers and processors to comply with the
regulation, especially in the development of DPIAs [7, 12, 25].
Standards already accepted for the protection and security of personally identifiable
information (PII) were also used as guide, such as ISO 27001 (Information technology:
Security techniques: Information security management systems: Requirements), ISO
29134 (Information technology: Security techniques: Code of practice for personally
identifiable information protection), ISO 27018 (Information technology: Security
techniques: Code of practice for protection of personally identifiable information (PII)
in public clouds acting as PII processors) and ISO 29100 (Information technology:
Security techniques: Privacy framework) [26–29].
1.3.2 GDPR Frameworks
In addition to the guides, some frameworks were also made available, during the last
year, for compliance with the GDPR.
As the system available by CNIL to perform DPIAs, in which the controller can
characterize each of its treatments and carry out a risk analysis, freely identifying
vulnerabilities, threats and corrective measures [13]. Or the test to evaluate the
implemented safety measures, made available by the AEPD, which according to closed
answers (mostly yes/no) assesses the level of information security and indicates what
corrective measures the organization should take [8]. Microsoft, also, made available a
semiautomatic risk assessment to assess in which measures the processing complies
with the regulation, indicating the corrective measures to be taken in order to reduce
the risk [34].
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Other DPAs also provided small closed-ended questionnaires so that organizations could
assess their level of compliance with the GDPR, and templates of official documents,
such as DPIAs, contracts, clauses, requests for consent, among others.
1.4 Contributions: Real World and Scientific
The proposal of DPIA for ISs was employed in an online platform (TekPrivacy)
that helps organizations, specially Data Protection Officers (DPO) to guarantee the
compliance with GDPR. And it has been, already, implemented in some national
organizations like GO Porto, APDL and CMP, in the process of compliance to the
GDPR.
During this project development, a short paper was accepted by “Privacy Security
Trust 2018” to be presented and published at the conference "16th Annual Conference
on Privacy, Security and Trust", and indexed with IEEE Xplore Digital Library [11].
1.5 Outline of the Thesis
This work is divided into 6 Chapters. The current chapter presents an introduction of
the work of this dissertation.
The next chapters of this document address the following topics:
In Chapter 2, the legal framework for protection of personal data in National reality is
discussed, as well as, the role of Article 29 Working Party and the GDPR requirements
that imply a "revisiting" of technology. One of the requirements that, so far, has not
yet been technically duly defined is the way to request for an auditable and explicit
consent, which is discussed in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, a proposal of DPIAs for ISs is
presented, where, an ISO mapping with the RGPD was made. Therefore, Chapter 5 is
where we present the assessment of the proposal of DPIA for ISs at CMP, APLD and
GO Porto, and explain the environment created to that end. Finally, the Chapter 6
presents some final remarks and lays the ground for future work.
Chapter 2
Legislation
The protection of personal data has an important role in the defense of individuals
rights, since it does not only protect privacy, but also helps the protection of principles
like freedom, equality and personal identity.
So, the right to respect for private and family life has been established since 1950, in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in article 12. "No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, domicile or correspondence, or attacks
on honor and reputation, and against such interference or attacks, everyone has the
right of the protection of the law." [2].
This right is also determined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
in Article 17 "No. 1 - No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his private life, family, home or correspondence, or unlawful attacks on honor
and reputation; of the law against such interventions or such attacks." [4], and the
European Convention on Human Rights in article 8 "No. 1 - Any person has the right
to respect for his or her private and family life, home address and correspondence.” [3].
This first big emphasis on the principle of reservation of private life was due to World
War II, which, due to the great impact of the invasion of privacy committed by the
Nazis and the consequent result, it became indispensable for States to limit the access
and usage of personal information of individuals.
Furthermore, each State dictates rights protecting the personal data and privacy of
citizens, according to each national reality.
15
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2.1 GDPR in the National Reality
2.1.1 Protection of Private Life
In the Portuguese law, the right to privacy of private life, which is embodied in the
rights of personality, was established in the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic of
1976 (CRP) (in the initial version) in the article 26 "1. Everyone is accorded the rights
to personal identity, to the development of personality, to civil capacity, to citizenship,
to a good name and reputation, to their image, to speak out, to protect the privacy of
their personal and family life, and to legal protection against any form of discrimination.
2. The law shall lay down effective guarantees against the improper procurement and
misuse of information concerning persons and families and its procurement or use
contrary to human dignity. 3. The law shall guarantee the personal dignity and genetic
identity of the human person, particularly in the creation, development and use of
technologies and in scientific experimentation." [6].
The processing of personal data might induce more information about the private life
of an individual and that information can correlate data that, as a rule, would not be
related. Thus, as we lose control of the result of the processing, the content generated
may be liable to harm the data subjects. So, it is of utmost importance that the data
processing is carried out in a conscious way and by people with the capacity to assess
the impact of its use on individuals’ lives. As we are addressing sensitive personal
information, the ownership of the information is guaranteed to the own individual, so
that the individuals can protect their information from access, treatment and sharing,
and respective consequences of their processing. The possessiveness can be observed
by the fact that, excepting special cases, only with the consent of the owner of the
information (data subject), personal data processing can be performed.
2.1.2 Data Protection
As a result of the development of technologies and the sharing of information on a
regular basis, such as e-commerce, internet of things and big data, there is an increasing
need to better protect individuals privacy and their personal data.
Thus, probably predicting the technological developments and to control this expanding
industry, the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic (CRP) covers the protection of
personal data in the article 35 (Use of information technology) “1. Every citizen has
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the right of access to all computerized data that concern him, which he may require to
be corrected and updated, and the right to be informed of the purpose for which they
are intended, as laid down by law. 2. The law shall define the concept of personal
data, together with the terms and conditions applicable to its automatized treatment
and its linkage, transmission and use, and shall guarantee its protection, particularly
by means of an independent administrative entity. 3. Information technology may not
be used to treat data concerning philosophical or political convictions, party or trade
union affiliations, religious faith, private life or ethnic origins, save with the express
consent of the data subject, or with an authorization provided for by law and with
guarantees of non- discrimination, or for the purpose of processing statistical data that
are not individually identifiable. 4. Third-party access to personal data is prohibited,
save in exceptional cases provided for by law. 6. Everyone is guaranteed free access to
public-use information technology networks. The law shall define the regime governing
cross-border data flows, and the appropriate means for protecting both personal data
and other data whose safeguarding is justified in the national interest. 7. Personal
data contained in manual files enjoy the same protection as that provided for in the
previous paragraphs, as laid down by law.” [6].
Alongside the principals defined in the CRP, the Personal Data Protection Act (Law
67/98, of 26 October) [5], based on the Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament
and the Council, dated October 24, 1995 [18], was implemented in 1998 and it was the
law in force until 25th of May of 2018. This law aimed to guarantee the protection
of the fundamental freedoms and rights of natural individuals, in particular privacy,
in relation to the processing of personal data. The Personal Data Protection Act
defined ’personal data’ as "... any information of any type, irrespective of the type of
medium involved, including sound and image, relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person (“data subject”); an identifiable person is one who can be identified,
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an indication number or to one
or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or
social identity;" [5] and the ’processing’ of personal data as "...any operation or set of
operations which is performed upon personal data, whether wholly or partly by automatic
means, such as collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation or alteration,
retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise
making available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure or destruction;" [5].
However, with the technological evolution, where more and more IT applications are
being used, data being collected, and the States themselves implemented online services,
ensuring the cybersecurity and protection of the personal data is crucial. What was no
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longer sufficiently guaranteed by the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, not only
because of the obvious technological progress and the need to process data, but also
because it is a directive and consequently not all EU countries met all the factors
defined by it, since each member State adapted the Directive according to National
reality.
2.1.3 General Data Protection Regulation
Therefore, the General Regulation on Data Protection (Regulation (EU) of the
European Parliament and of the Council 2016/679 of 27 April 2016) was designed to
harmonize data privacy laws across Europe to protect all private data of EU citizens,
and to reshape how the organizations of the Union address data privacy [10] laying
down rules on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal
data and the free circulation of such data [Art. 1, paragraph 1 of the GDPR] [19].
However, some changes imposed by the GDPR in the approach of processing data
enforced the implementation of several measures. Whereas, some of these concepts are
already uniformed and applied in some organizations, others are a new concept that
the institutions still have some questions on how to implement them.
Some of the changes present in the GDPR encompasses the increase of the territorial
scope, the improvement of the definition of consent, the definition of special data,
increase of the rights of data subjects, control of automated decisions, mandatory
implementation of the concept Privacy by Design, the definition of Data Protection
Officer and the values of the fines [10].
In order to help the compliance with GDPR, the Article 29 Working Party [36] has
elaborated articles, about some issues addressed in the regulation, exemplifying and
explaining how to be GDPR compliant.
Even so, the measures imposed have such a large impact on organizations that this
regulation had a two-year waiting period, between the entry into force and beginning
to be applied, to enable organizations to adapt to it.
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2.2 Consent According with GDPR
One of the changes imposed by the GDPR is related to the way consent is expressed
from the data subject, serving as a legal basis for the the processing of his personal
data. This is one of the main focus of this thesis.
Consent plays an important moral role, with the capacity of transforming the normative
expectations that are hold between people and groups, whether directly or through
various institutional arrangements, if properly given. Therefore, consent can be
compared with a proprietary gate that one opens to allow another’s access, which
would be impermissible absent the act of voluntary opening such gate [35].
2.2.1 Legal Aspects
Given its importance for the technical aspects considerations, in this subsection, we
summarize the list and discussion of legal requirements presented in the guidelines of
the Art. 29 Working Party on Consent.
In the GDPR, Articles are binding and Recitals are used for interpretative purposes,
that is why, in this work, we try to use the recitals. By doing this, some sub-components
of the elements of the definition of personal data (informed, specific, freely given and
unambiguous) are highlighted. For example, explicit consent is only needed in certain
cases, such as for special categories of data.
Notice that, in some cases Recitals are more fundamental than the binding Articles. In
particular, Recital 43 stating that for the freely given requirement the provision of the
service should not be made conditional upon consent. However, in the binding parts
so Article 7(4) the words utmost account are used.
According to the regulation, "consent should be given by a clear affirmative act
establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data
subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her, such as by
a written statement, including by electronic means, or an oral statement. This could
include ticking a box when visiting an internet website, choosing technical settings for
information society services or another statement or conduct which clearly indicates
in this context the data subject’s acceptance of the proposed processing of his or her
personal data. Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not therefore constitute
consent. Consent should cover all processing activities carried out for the same purpose
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or purposes. When the processing has multiple purposes, consent should be given for
all of them. If the data subject’s consent is to be given following a request by electronic
means, the request must be clear, concise and not unnecessarily disruptive to the use of
the service for which it is provided."[Recital 32] [19].
Beyond the aforementioned description, the GDPR also defines that "where processing
is based on the data subject’s consent, the controller should be able to demonstrate that
the data subject has given consent to the processing operation."[Recital 42] [19].
Therefore, in order to comply with the regulation, consent expression must have the
follow characteristics:
Freely given [Recitals 32, 42, 43 & Article 7 no 4]
Data subject must have a real choice and control. If the data subject feels obliged to
consent or that the non-consent leads to negative consequences, i.e., if the consent is
described as a non-negotiable requirement, then the consent is not considered valid [38].
Granular [Recital 43]
Granular is a specification of Freely Given but considering the relevance and the
novelty of this characteristic we decided to highlight it. Therefore, consent is not
considered freely given if the data subject thinks/assumes that all purposes are all
in one, wherefore data subjects should be free to choose which purposes they accept,
rather than having to consent to all processing purposes [38].
Specific [Recital 32 & Article 7 no2]
This characteristic is tightly coupled with the previous one and aims to ensure
transparency and control from data subject [38]. Data subject must be informed
of all the purposes related to the data processing, and he/she must choose in relation
to each one of them, and to that end. As such the information given must be clearly
segregated [38] regarding each purpose.
Informed [Recitals 32, 42 & Article 7 no2]
Data subject must be informed about the processing operations before the consent
is presented. The information must be given in a clear and plain language, where
statements filled with legal jargon cannot be used and information relevant to make
informed decisions cannot be hidden [38]. If the target audience includes data subjects
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that are underage, the provided information must be understandable by them [38].
Unambiguous indication of wishes [Recital 32]
Data subject must give a statement or a clear affirmative act that consents the data
processing to the different purposes, which means that the consent always must be
given through an active action or declaration from the data subjects part [38].
In some cases, all these characteristics are still not enough, and explicit consent by
the data subject is required. Some examples are: processing of special categories of
data; communication of personal data to an organization or country that does not
guarantee the adequate safeguards; or when automated individual decision-making is
realized [19, 38].
Explicit [Recitals 51, 71 and Article 9 no 2 al. a)]
For the consent be explicit, the data subject must give a positive statement of consent,
to expressly consent in a written statement the processing operations or transfer of the
personal data, since an oral statement might not be audit-capable [38].
In addition to the characteristics already indicated, there are still two additional
complements that the consent must contain to be considered valid, namely:
Auditable (demonstrate consent) [Recital 42]
Controllers must be able to demonstrate that the data subject in a given case has
consented and that the consent was given in a valid way, linking the consent to the
processing operations [38].
Withdrawal [Articles 7 no 3]
Data subject must be informed on how to withdrawal the consent before the consent is
given, as well as any other subject rights. The withdrawal of consent must be as easy
as the act of giving it [38].
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2.2.2 Technical Aspects
The expression of positive consent is clearly one of the new aspects with the greatest
impact on the implementation of the GDPR, due to some technical requirements
that have not yet been solved. Since the consent criteria are technically demanding,
particular attention should be paid to the form of application, so as not to compromise
the usability of the application. As the final user may quit from using the application
due to its low usability on the request for a complex consent.
Below, it is presented a technical orientation on the different characteristics identified
in the previous section and on how they should be applied.
Freely given
To express consent, the data subject should know of all the implications of the processing
operations and cannot be under any kind of coercion, which is impossible to prove, if
the person is not visible (typical in an online environment).
Data subject cannot feel that by refusing to consent a second purpose, the application
cannot be used. Unless processing is required to provide the service, consent is only
freely given if the use of an application is not conditional upon consent.
Granular
When the legal base to process personal data is the consent, a previous request of
consent to data’s access and processing operations should be asked. Moreover, different
purposes, e.g., channel used to communicate, processing operations objective and data
to be collected, must be identified and segregated in order to allow the data subject to
only select the ones he wants.
Specific
The information related to the data processing operations presented in the consent
request must be segregated from the rest of the information, the consent requests
must be granular and the purpose must be specified [38]. Thus, data subjects must be
informed about the intended purposes for the data processing, as such there must be
opt-in options for each purpose, with the appropriate information [38].
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Informed
The consent must describe the controller’s identity with the purposes for each processing
operation, the data to be collected, the existence of the subject’s rights and how to
apply them, activities performed in the processing operations and whether there is
data transfer to third countries in the absence of an adequacy decision and appropriate
safeguards. All this information should be given before obtaining the consent from
data subject.
Unambiguous indication of wishes
Data subject must give a statement or a clear affirmative act that consents the data
processing operations. That way, pre-selected options or out-out requests are not
accepted, and the data subject must be the one who expresses the consent through a
written or (a recorded) oral statement that selects the options being consented, among
others [38].
Explicit
The consent must show that it was given by the data subject and clearly identify
what was consented and that it had a real action from the data subject to consent the
purpose. The explicit consent must also be able to be verified in order to guarantee
its validity and that the data subject authorized the use of his/her data for each purpose.
Auditable
The records and purposes of the consent requests must be stored and they must prove
that data subject gave the consent. It also has feature the date of submission of
the consent, the way it was given, the work-flow that originated it, the information
that was given at the time of the request and finally, what data the subject consented to.
Withdrawal
The consent mechanism must indicate also how to withdraw consent at any given time.
The withdraw procedure must be as easy as it was to give consent in the first place.
Subsequently, the means to withdraw the consent should be presented in the same way
as initially the consent was given [38], in particular consent should be revocable for
selected purposes.
In fact, the industry has already implemented some methods to minimize the usability
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issues regarding the collection of the consent, however, it is still categorized as an
obstacle to overall service usability [15]. This problem is further exacerbated due to
the fact that it must be auditable and, in some cases, extended to explicit.
In addition, it is also advisable to refresh the consent at appropriate intervals, in order
to guarantee the compliance with the wishes of data subjects and remind them of
associated data processing operations.
Furthermore, considering the sensibility of children personal data and the required
safeguards concerned with their privacy rights, a set of specific conditions must be
met in the collection of their consent. More specifically, in order to collect consent
for purposes of marketing, creating personality, definition of profiles and collection of
personal data with regard to children when using services offered directly to a child, the
consent from the holder of parental responsibility must be provided. However, it is not
necessary to do so in the context of preventive or counselling services offered directly
to a child. Although, the information provided to children should be in presented in a
clear and plain language so it can be easily understood by them [19].
In these cases, the consent support mechanism must be specialized so that the request
for consent is forwarded to the holder of parental responsibility, so that consent is
given to the processing of the child’s personal data. Although the regulation argues
that this definition of a child is for children under 16 years. This allows each State
Member to adapt to its context, thus allowing this age to decrease to 13 years.
2.3 Article 29 Working Party
The Working Party responsible for the Protection of Individuals with regard to the
Processing of Personal Data, commonly known as the Article 29 Working Party (Art.29
WP), is an independent EU advisory body on data protection and privacy, composed by
representatives from all EU Member States, the European Data Protection Supervisor
and the representative of the European Commission [1].
Art.29 WP was conventionalized by Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the dissemination
of such data. Its functions are defined in Article 30 of that Directive and in Article 15
of Directive 2002/58/EC on privacy and electronic communications [1].
Art.29 WP examined any question concerning the application of the measures adopted
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under the Directive in order to contribute to the standardization of the application of
those measures, giving an opinion on the level of protection in the Community and
in third countries to the Commission, advising the Commission on any additional
or specific measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the individuals with
regard to the processing of personal data and any other proposals for Community
measures affecting such rights and freedoms and issues an opinion on codes conduct at
Community level [1].
The Group, on its own initiative, makes recommendations on all matters relating
to privacy and data protection in the European Community. Art.29 WP conducted
online consultations on data protection issues related to intellectual property rights,
RFID, video surveillance, binding corporate rules, electronic health records and, more
recently, the protection of children’s personal data. It has issued a number of opinions
on subjects such as the transfer of information from travelers’ personal identification
records to the US, the introduction of biometric data in passports and visas, the transfer
of financial information to the US, the introduction of data retention requirements
across the EU, a draft of the Commission decision on standard contractual clauses for
the transfer of personal data to processors established in third countries pursuant to the
Directive 95/46/EC and on proposals to amend the Privacy Directive and Electronic
Communications (Directive 2002/58/EC) [1].
The opinions and recommendations of Art.29 WP are sent to the European Commission
and to the Committee set up to assist Article 31 of the European Commission Directive
95/46/EC that informs Art.29 WP of the measures it has taken in response to its
opinions and recommendations through a public report. This report is also forwarded
to the European Parliament and the Council. Art.29 WP is as well responsible for
publishing an annual report highlighting the evolution of data protection across the
EU and in each EU country and the European Economic Area. This annual report is
also transmitted to the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council [1].
However, with the application of GDPR the Art.29 WP will be replaced by the
European Data Protection Board (EDPB) [19]. Nevertheless, until its replacement
the Art.29 WP is providing expert advice to the States regarding data protection and
promoting the consistent application of GDPR, like was given under the Directive
95/46/EC.
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2.4 GDPR Requirements that Imply a "Revisiting"
of Technology
As technology has advanced, as well as the physical to digital process transfer, the
mechanisms should also have advanced to ensure the same levels of digital security
and privacy found in the physical.
Although most of the measures are procedural, the GDPR also imposes the organizations
to take extra care on the conditions the data is handled technically, to re-calibrate the
security and privacy level between physical and digital environments, requiring the
implementation and alteration of the process of diverse technological tools, implying
the "revising" of current technological mechanisms.
Most of these changes are related to the concepts introduced by privacy by design
and privacy by default written into Article 25, which although not new, they have
now become mandatory, implying that any action by an organization involving the
processing of personal data must be made with data protection and privacy in mind at
all stages (Privacy by Design), and once a product or service has been released to the
public, stiffer privacy settings should be applied by default, without any manual end
user input (Privacy by Default).
One of the key aspects can be considered the procedures to collect consent, as they
shall be audit-capable and enable data subjects to express their consent according with
the GDPR requirements; the methods to execute the right to be forgotten, that should
guarantee that when the data is removed, its reconstruction should be impossible;
the auditability of ISs; and the anonymity and pseudonymity of the data when the
identification of the individuals is not requested.
These changes in technologies are implemented by organizations to ensure that they
are in compliance with the fundamental principles and requirements of GDPR and
those alterations are part of the focus on accountability.
Chapter 3
Expressing Explicit and Auditable
Consent
There are several legal grounds to allow the possessing of personal data, being one
of them the consent of the data subject. Consent gives data subjects control over
his personal data, processed or not [38]. Thus, if consent is used correctly, it is a
powerful tool that gives data subjects control over the processing of their personal data,
otherwise, which is the prevalent case, control of the data subject becomes illusory and
consent constitutes an inadequate basis for data processing [37].
Given the power that consent has on the processing of personal data, the way to request
consent of the data subject on the processing of his/her personal data was revised in
GDPR, becoming one of the key changes of the regulation.
Consent Historical Context
Consent plays an important moral role, with the capacity of transforming the normative
expectations that are hold between people and groups, whether directly or through
various institutional arrangements, if appropriately given. Therefore, consent can be
compared with a proprietary gate that one opens to allow another’s access, which
would be impermissible absent the act of voluntary opening such gate [35].
The history of the informed consent is rooted in multiple disciplines and social context,
including those of the health professionals, law, the social and behavioral sciences,
and moral philosophy [20]. Being interpreted as a form of respect for autonomy and
individuality of the individuals. Consequently, informed consent is interpreted as a
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moral principle of respect for autonomy [20].
With the technological evolution, a further scope of application of informed consent was
found, arising as an issue of paramount importance within the scope of the protection
of privacy and of the processing of personal data [32]. This application is even more
challenging, since it is found in a different (digital) environment, and thus, it is necessary
to find new ways to adjust the consent of individuals.
3.1 Existing Technologies to Express Consent
In the present-day, a lot of solutions are being implemented for organizations to request
data subjects to express their consent to the processing of their personal data. Although,
not all of them fully meet the requirements imposed by GDPR.
The majority of consent mechanisms applied until now, fail to meet the requirements
of GDPR, because they were given in an implicit or opt-out way. Notice that, the
notion of implicit consent was not defined and foreseen by the Directive, neither the
opt-out practice. The implicit mode defines that the data subject feels that the consent
must be given in order to use the product - most of the times appearing with only one
button to agree -. The opt-out mean implies that the data subject must remove the
consent, being pre-assumed that the consent is given - most of the times the way to
withdraw the consent is omitted -.
With the increasing awareness of the measures imposed by GDPR, new proposals of
mechanisms to give consent started to appear, mainly in a way where the description
of the processing operations is clearly presented to the individual and identifies for
what and whom the data will be accessed. So, the data subject has the option to agree
or disagree with each processing operations and respective data to be collected, which
means that those consent requests comply with the request of a regular consent.
Nevertheless, not all of them can be classified as being explicit. For a consent be
explicit, the records related to the consent must prove that it was the data subject that
gave consent, that existed a positive action to consent, and this must be unequivocal,
expressing exactly the wishes of the data subject. These characteristics must also be
followed with the audit-capable property, that features the date of submission of the
consent, how it was given and the information that was given in the request.
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3.1.1 Existing Technologies
Advanced Electronic Signature
The consent process includes the form with a field to add the digital signature and a
submission button. This process can be done online and does not need any equipment
since the signature can be made from a certificate that is stored on the computer,
minimizing usability issues identified in the Signature - Present, as we will see below.
The digital signature with a certificate that is not validated by a competent identity,
a signature with an advanced electronic certificate, it must be uniquely capable of
identifying and linking its signatory and guarantees the integrity of the document.
So, a qualified electronic signature is an advanced electronic signature with a digital
certificate that has been encrypted by a secure signature creation device.
Code Sent by email
This consent method includes the form with a submission button and two fields, one
to add the email, where a confirmation code will be sent, and other to place the code
received. After getting the consent form completed, the data subject submits the code
received by email, and sends the form.
Code Sent by SMS
Similar to the previous one, the consent system includes the form with a submission
button and two fields, one to add the phone number where a confirmation code will be
sent, and other to place the code. After getting the consent form completed, the data
subject submits the code received by SMS, and sends the form.
Code to Access the Consent Given
Similar to two-factor authentication by SMS or email, but in this case the code is not
used to submit the consent, instead it is to confirm the consent given.
Thus, the consent form has a submission button and a field to add a phone number
or an email to where the code will be sent after the data subject submits the consent.
Therefore, the data subject can access the form to verify if it is in accordance with the
expected and change whenever appropriate.
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Confirmation Button of the Consent by Email
The consent form, in this mechanism, has a submission button and a field to add an
email address. So, after the form is submitted, the data subject receives an email with
all the parameters consented, so that the data subject can confirm by pressing the
button that leads to a link.
Consent Given Sent by Email
The consent form, in this mechanism, has a submission button and a field to add an
email address. Therefore, after the form is submitted, the data subject receives an
email with all the parameters consented, so that the data subject answers it to confirm.
Digital Mobile Key with SMS
The Digital Mobile Key is a mechanism of authentication that allows the association
of a mobile phone number with the civil identification number of a citizen, this method
is provided by some countries, such as in Portugal.
Thus, the consent system includes the form with a submission button and three fields,
one to add the phone number where a confirmation code will be sent, other to add
the PIN of Digital Mobile Key and other to place the code. After getting the consent
form completed, the data subject submits the code received by SMS, and sends the form.
Digital Mobile Key with Smartphone Application
The application Digital Mobile Key is an alternative to the mechanism previously
mentioned, being this time, the code sent by a push notification to the smartphone
that is related to the civil identification number. With this mechanism is also possible
to generate new codes and control the live time of each one. This method is similar
with Google Authenticator.
Thus, the consent system includes the form with a submission button and three fields,
one to add the phone number, other to add the PIN of Digital Mobile Key and other to
place the code generated in the application. After getting the consent form completed,
the data subject submits the code, and sends the form.
Email from Data Subject
The data subject sends by email to the controller of the processing operations with the
form provided by the controller, indicating what the data subject consents.
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Login Authentication
This mechanism implies that the data subject is already authenticated when the consent
is completed and submitted. Which by default is a problem, because in order to give
consent, the individual must already have an account and consequently already must
be using the application.
The consent form has a submission button, the record of the consent is saved on the
user account after this is sent, thus it is documented.
Qualified Electronic Signature
Digital signatures are like electronic "fingerprints." In the form of a coded message,
the digital signature securely associates a subscriber with a document in a recorded
transaction, using a standard and accepted format it provides the highest level on both
security and universal acceptance [17].
Therefore, the certificate present in the qualified electronic signature, like national
electronic identification (eID) schemes, is issued by a qualified trust service provider,
that attests the authenticity of the electronic signature to serve as proof of the identity
of the signatory.
Accordingly, the consent process includes the form with a field to add the digital
signature and a submission button. This process can be made online, which minimizes
the usability issues identified in the previous mechanism.
The citizen ID card managed by some governments is an example of a qualified electronic
signature. However, in most cases obligates the possession of the necessary equipment
and software to use it, limiting the data subjects’ universe.
Signature - Present
A signature is used to permanently appended a single person, in an indelible manner,
to a document. It then can be used as physical evidence of that person’s personal
testimony and certification of the signed content.
Thus, at the time of giving consent, it is demanded the physical presence of data
subjects to sign and date the form. After the consent is given from data subject, a
copy of the document is given to data subject and signed by both parties.
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Submission of a Document Proving Identity
This consent system includes a form with submission button and a field to submit a
document that proves the identity of the data subject. The data subject completes the
form, submits a document and sends the form.
Voice Call
This consent system is frequently used by the marketing companies, where companies
come in contact with the data subject through a voice call. In this process, a call
is recorded and the consent of the data subjects for different purposes is recorded.
During the call, all the necessary information for an informed consent is given and any
questions presented by the data subject can be resolved at the time.
3.1.2 Compliance of the Technologies with GDPR
The necessary mappings between the mechanisms identified in this section and the
previously defined characteristics that the consent must meet are shown in Table 3.1.
As a recap, the characteristics include Freely given (F), Granular (G), Specific (S),
Informed (I), Unambiguous indication of wishes (Un), Auditable (A), Withdrawal (W)
and Explicit (E). Furthermore, it also shows if the mechanism guarantees the Data
Minimization (DM) principle, and whenever the information can be done Electronically
(El) or it must be in person.
In order to carry out the analysis of compliance with GDPR, it is assumed that, for each
mechanism, the maximum possible completeness with the identified characteristics of
the consent are implemented, so we assess the best possible scenario for each mechanism
by itself. Thus, it is analyzed at its best, how the system complies with the GDPR.
Thus, when analyzing Table 3.1 we can verify that all mechanisms can only guarantee the
completeness of the characteristics granularity, specificity, information, unambiguous
indication of wishes and withdraw of the consent as defined by GDPR. The remaining
can only be accomplished by some methods, either totally or partially, and in some
cases, it is still needed the combination of other actions. Those cases are explained
below.
Freely Given
The mechanisms Voice Call and Signature - Present can contemplate all the require-
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Table 3.1: Features accomplished by the consent mechanisms identified.
Mechanism F G S I Un A W E DM El
Advanced Electronic Signature 37 3 3 3 3 37 3 3 37 3
Code Sent by Email 37 3 3 3 3 37 3 37 3 3
Code Sent by SMS 37 3 3 3 3 37 3 3 37 3
Code to Access the Consent
Given
37 3 3 3 3 37 3 37 3 3
Confirmation Button by Email 37 3 3 3 3 37 3 37 3 3
Consent Given Sent by Email 37 3 3 3 3 37 3 3 3 3
Digital Mobile Key with
Application
37 3 3 3 3 37 3 37 37 3
Digital Mobile Key with SMS 37 3 3 3 3 37 3 3 37 3
Email from the data subject 37 3 3 3 3 37 3 3 3 3
Login Authentication 37 3 3 3 3 37 3 7 3 3
Qualified Electronic Signature 37 3 3 3 3 37 3 3 37 3
Signature - Present 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3* 37 7
Submission of a Document 37 3 3 3 3 37 3 37 7 3
Voice Call 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 7 37













* = Needs an extra action.
ments in order to the consent being freely given. However, in the presence of other
people during the action of consent can be considered coercive.
Although, in the remaining mechanisms we cannot observe if the data was given under
coercion, so we consider that they only partially comply with the requirements, since
they are able to give an explanation of all the implications of the processing operations.
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Auditable
Likewise, the mechanisms Signature - Present and Voice Call are the only ones that
entirely comply with the conditions defined for being considered auditable as defined
by GDPR.
On the other hand, although the method Qualified Electronic Signature guarantees the
identity of data subject, it cannot guarantee that the data subject is signing the correct
form, but only that what was signed is irrevocable. This problem also occurs with an
Advanced Electronic Signature, but in the latter, the identity of the data subject is not
guaranteed.
Finally, the rest of the mechanisms still do not have a way to ensure that the document
that is being accepted is the intended one. It is also necessary that all objects used to
attain consent must be signed shortly after being used in order to date the consent.
Every digital consent’s models should permit the consent to be printed after given, in
order to provide proof to the data subject. However, this option would cause a storage
problem.
Explicit
The electronic signatures guarantee the non-repudiation of the signed documents/forms,
so they are the only methods that comply with the legal requirements just by their
specifications.
The Signature - Present can only be explicit if it is guaranteed that the document
where consent has been given, no other new authorizations can be added. For that,
the data subject must discard the options that were not consented, like drawing a plus
sign in the not wanted boxes, making it impossible to add consent in those options.
The rest of the methods might demonstrate the intention of data subject to give
consent, but they can suffer spoofing and man-in-the-middle attacks, which means that
the identity of the data subject cannot be guaranteed.
However, although the mechanisms Code sent by Email and Code sent by SMS might
suffer from spoofing attacks, it is possible to validate the items consented, by generating
a code that have a predefined part that identifies which items were selected. These
methods allow greater validation on the part of the user since it can validate the first
part of the code, confirming if its choices coincide.
It should be mentioned that the method Submission of a Document, which might seem
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relatively secure, it is in fact not safe, as the document can be easily forged, so in turn,
it can also suffer from spoofing attacks.
Data Minimization
The consent mechanisms themselves should not be intrusive and create a higher risk
than the processing operation leading to consent. Thus, although those mechanisms
cannot guarantee the anonymity of the data subject, most of them are not very intrusive,
most of them only requesting an email address, being the data subjects able to hide
their real identity. The trad-off between auditability and data minimization should be
balanced by the data sensibility.
The Login Authentication, according to the registration form of the platform, may be
the least intrusive, allowing data subject to create an account anonymously.
The mechanisms that collect phone numbers are more intrusive than the previous
mentioned, since in most cases the data subject uses the personal number.
A signature, digital or paper collects more data, but it is the most reliable method
to guarantee the identity of the data subject, so by the proportionality criteria this
method is a good choice if it is intended to obtain the real identity of the data subject.
Electronic certificates can have pseudonyms, which provides a method so that at the
level of authentication, the data subject identity cannot be crossed by different service
providers, and allows the signature from pseudonyms, this feature is already in use on
German identification cards [9].
Nevertheless, there are some mechanisms more intrusive like the Voice Call that collects
a biometric standard, voice, so this mechanism can be too intrusive in order to collect a
consent. Depending on the information contained in the document, the Submission of
a Document may also be overly intrusive for the intended purpose, taking into account
that it is also not a very reliable mechanism.
3.2 Risk Analysis
The term Risk Analysis, inserted in the context of personal data protection, can be
understood as the "process that identifies and evaluates in a systematic, methodological
and repeatable manner the risks on personal data to which the critical business resources
of the organizations are subject, enabling the definition of the means by which they
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can be protected".
With regard to the processing operations under GDPR, a Data Protection Impact
Assessment (DPIA) is advised, and in some cases required, in order to assist the
organizations in identifying and minimizing the privacy risks of new projects or
policies [24].
Therefore, for the elaboration of the DPIA, the data controller must prepare a risk
analyses of the processing operations. Being, one of the parameters that must be
assessed, the way of asking for consent, thus this work was developed in order to help
in the elaboration of DPIAs, particularly this chapter elaborates an assessment of the
consent methodologies.
To carry out the risk analysis, seven raters were asked to evaluate according to their
experience the different parameters in the various mechanisms. For the selection of
raters, their experience and diversity in the scope of activities were taken into account,
and then selected according to convenience. Thus, the raters experience are: one MSc
student, one PhD student, one Assistant Professor with more than 10 years’ experience,
one Associate Professor with more than 20 years’ experience, one security expert with
more than 10 years’ experience, and finally two technical privacy professionals working
in two different data protection authorities with more than 10 years’ experience.
The mechanisms for consent were assessed in their compliance regarding the require-
ments defined in GDPR and their usability and threats, in a rating scale of 1(very
bad), 2(bad), 3(good) and finally 4(very good) for the purpose of elaborating their Risk
Analysis, as described in the table 3.2. Because the characteristics granular, specific,
informed, unambiguous indication of wishes and withdraw can always be achieved by
all methods, they were not considered in this analysis.
In order to calculate the risk, weights were used to differentiate the most important
characteristics, with Trustworthy (T) - which quantifies the confidence of the mechanism
in accomplishing the expected, the probability of attacks that the mechanism can
undergo and the level of ease in carrying out the attack - being the most important -
since is the one that levels the confidence in the model -, followed by the Explicitness
(E) and Auditability (A) - because they are those that have a more complex scope
-, then Freely given (F) and finally Usability (U) - since is out of the scope of the
regulation -. Thus, the formula used was
Risk(%) = MAX_RISK − (F + 1, 5A+ 1, 5E + 0, 5U + 2T )
MAX_RISK × 100.
Notice that the risk calculation expression was created based on the authors experience,
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so it should not be taken as a standard before further evaluation and validation.
Table 3.2: Risk analysis of the consent mechanisms identified.
# Mechanism F A E U T Risk
1 Qualified Electronic Signature 4 4 4 2 4 12%
2 Signature - Present 4 4 4 1 4 13%
3 Digital Mobile Key with Application 3 3 3 3 3 23%
4 Digital Mobile Key with SMS 3 3 4 3 3 23%
5 Code Sent by SMS 3 2 4 4 3 27%
6 Advanced Electronic Signature 2 3 4 2 3 31%
7 Code to Access the Consent Given 3 2 3 3 2 31%
8 Voice Call 3 3 3 3 2 33%
9 Email from the Data Subject 2 3 4 3 2 35%
10 Code Sent by Email 3 2 3 4 2 35%
11 Consent Given Sent by Email 2 2 4 3 2 38%
12 Login Authentication 2 2 2 3 2 42%
13 Confirmation Button by Email 2 2 3 4 1 44%
14 Submission of a Document 2 2 3 2 1 52%






In this subsection we evaluate the agreement among the raters regarding the different
parameters in the various mechanisms.
Methods
Interobserver agreement among experts was assessed using the proportions of agreement
(PA). R software (‘obs. agree’ package) was used to compute the PA [22]. Ninety-five
percent confidence intervals (95%CI) were calculated [22]. We present the agreement
among observers in Table 3.3. From the results we can conclude that the agreement
among observers is very low, in fact when a given observer rates one method the
probability of another one will give the same rate ranges from 30% to 40%. This shows
that the risk classification is not consensual, further more given different experience
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levels in this subject as in our study. To overcome the lack of agreement the median of
raters was considered as the best approach.
Table 3.3: Agreement between observers
on the mechanisms of consent.
PA [95% CI]
Freely Given (F) 0.30 [0.25,0.38]
Auditability (A) 0.41 [0.35,0.49]
Explicitness (E) 0.31 [0.25,0.39]
Usability (U) 0.38 [0.31,0.45]
Trustworthy (T) 0.33 [0.29,0.40]
PA = Proportion of Agreement;
95% CI = 95% Confidence Interval.
3.2.2 Analysis of Risk Results
Analyzing the Table 3.2, we can conclude that the best methods to achieve a consent
that can be used are the ones that require a valid signature that qualifies the identity
of the data subjects, whether it is a normal signature, if the request for consent is
personally requested, or an electronic signature, with a qualified electronic certificate,
if the consent is given electronically. However, both methods fail in usability, with
the signature that requires the presence of the data subject considered worse than
the electronic one, since it geographically limits the data subject. Even though some
measures are needed to optimize the Paper Signed in Person.
Nevertheless, they are not the only methods that can be applied, others with higher
risk can also be used, but their risk must be considered in the DPIA. It should be
noted that the choice of consent mechanism should be weighted according to factors
such as context and data type used in the processing operation.
The digital signature with a certificate that is not validated by a competent identity,
a signature with an advanced electronic certificate, it must be uniquely capable of
identifying and linking its signatory and guarantees the integrity of the document.
So, a qualified electronic signature is an advanced electronic signature with a digital
certificate that has been encrypted by a secure signature creation device.
An Email from Data Subject might suffer from spoofing attacks [33], as well as man-
in-the middle-attacks [31]. However, if the email is signed with a qualified certificate
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then its security and reliability is the same level as the qualitative electronic signature
method.
The limitation of the universe of individuals ends with the Code sent by email, but
this method is, as well, susceptible to attacks of man in the middle [31] and spoofing
attacks [33].
Code sent by SMS, like the previous, it does not create limitations on the size of the
universe of individuals but might suffer from spoofing attacks as well as man-in-the-
middle attacks. Although, this method is safer than the previous one since it uses
different channels of communication.
The methods using a Digital Mobile Key identifies the real identity of the data subject,
because they are related to a qualified electronic certificate.
Digital mobile key, since combines the "Two-factor Authentication by SMS" and "Digital
Signature" have a mix of obstacles identified by both mechanisms, on the one hand it
limits the universe of individuals, since the government must provide this method, and
on the other hand, the code can be intercepted by a man-in-the-middle attack, but no
longer suffers from spoofing attacks. Even so, this mechanism is more practical than
the direct use of the smart card (Digital Signature), although with less guarantees.
Digital mobile key with smartphone application combines the "Two-factor Authentication
by application" and "Digital Signature" has a limited universe of individuals - government
must provide, as well, this method - and the data subject are required to have a
smartphone. Its security level is also dependent on the quality of the application.
Nevertheless, this mechanism is more practical than the direct use of the smart card
(Digital Signature) and, if the application is well implemented, the risk of suffering
man-in-the middle attacks is considered low.
The risk associated with login authentication is related to the authentication and
identification mechanism, which, for example, can only be the pair username/password
or can be by duo factor. The controller must also guarantee that until the data subject
defines what he/she consents, his/her personal data cannot be processed. However,
this method is not ideal because the data subject must already be associated with the
system, without being informed of its functionalities and requirements.
A code to access the consent given and consent given sent by email might suffer from
spoofing [33] and man in the middle attacks [31]. However, the second one is more
explicit, since its needed an extra action from data subject to consent. On the other
hand, the first allows the data subject to access the form whenever wanted.
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A voice call, if correctly applied can be a reliable mechanism since it can promote the
freely given factor. The recording of the call demonstrates the information provided
to data subjects and their reaction to it. Nevertheless, the recording of voice can be
very intrusive to the privacy of the data subject and generate new risks to the data
subject, in addition, it is also subject to impersonation attacks and the information
given to the data subject might be excessive to receive entirely by the phone (limiting
the freely given factor) and lastly, the record can be modified.
A submission of a document proving identity, like the previous, is subject to spoofing
and man in the middle attacks because a document is easily forged. This mechanism
also gives a false sense of security since a printed document cannot guarantee the
digital identity of a person.
The confirmation button of the consent by email in addition of being susceptible to
both man in the middle [31] and spoofing attacks [33]. Besides, due to the easiness
of masking malicious websites, attackers might use this method to perform phishing
attacks. Therefore, this mechanism should not be used since it might become a threat
to cybersecurity and data protection.
3.3 Cleaning Personal Data from Databases for Mar-
keting Purposes
A special case to take in consideration during the period of adaptation to GDPR is the
restructuring of the processing operations already in process, including the conformity
with the consent requests.
The marketing campaigns will be mostly under two lawfulness of processing, the consent
condition or the legitimate interest, after establishing a contract. If they follow by
consent, then they have to verify if the consent has already been collected according
with GDPR, if not the companies have to recollect or collect the consent of the data
subjects already on their databases.
The request for consent must be granular, which means that the controllers must
identify the marketing campaigns they have and let the data subjects select which ones
they want to receive notifications.
In this case, the consent request is directed, since the controller just wants to validate
the consent of the data subjects already under processing operations, and consequently,
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already has a channel to communicate, with the email being the most common. To
be noted that, using a channel to communicate with the data subject without being
initially consented is against GDPR, so this request must be done before the application
of GDPR.
So, the easiest way to request the consent would be by the method already described,
namely Confirmation Button by Email, but this mechanism is not a good option since
phishing attacks can be easily masked using this approach. An SMS with a link is also
considered insecure, since it automatically directs to a webpage that is susceptible to
phishing attacks.
These methods can be accomplished in two different ways. The first is by sending
an email for each purpose, resulting in the data subject with a full message box and
ignoring them all. The alternative approach is to send a link where all the purposes
are listed.
If the email sent to data subjects does not have a link but asks to go to the company’s
webpage in order to select their preferences, then there is no exposure to phishing, but
the adhesion of the data subject is lower, since it requires more actions from them. As
with the previous, it has the level of risk as sending an SMS.
Likewise, if the data subjects are requested to answer to the email identifying the
purposes they consent, then the email sent by the company should identify the purposes
of the processing operations.
Another way frequently used by the marketing companies, is the Voice Calls. This
mechanism is not vulnerable to phishing attacks but is geographically and time limited
to the call centers and employees of the company with the aggravating factor that is
the most intrusive mechanism presented.
If the company has a webpage where authentication is needed, then the consent can be
requested in the portal, by the login authentication. This consent method is the least
intrusive for data subject, since only the interested data subjects access to the portal.
In the consent request, companies should be careful not to overload the data subjects
as it may lead the data subjects to ignore the requests. Thus, the company can request
consent only for campaigns that the data subject is already subscribed to. And at a
later stage, when the data subject asks to change the settings, the company might
present all available campaigns.
Chapter 4
Proposal of DPIAs for Information
Systems
The GDPR sets out different obligations depending on the nature of the personal data
that is processed, as well as the ways to collect consent or the level of security measures
to be implemented.
In general, information security can be defined as the preservation of the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of information. Thus, a set of controls, such as policies,
practices, procedures, organizational structures and software functionalities shall be
implemented.
4.1 Problem Found: Motivation
During the past years, we have witnessed massive record data breaches because of
many information security incidents involving PIIs that have affected both individuals
and organizations, some of the incidents involving legal liability, identity theft, and
recovery costs.
With the introduction of the GDPR, the organizations (controllers and processors)
became responsible for the compliance of the regulation without the comfort of the
DPAs’ opinion, by the principle of accountability, and non-compliance with these
obligations may result in significant financial impacts, with fines with values never
seen, accompanied by reputation depreciation, since data breaches must be disclosed
to data subjects if breach entails risks to individuals
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This combination originates that the non-compliance is no longer suitable for the
organizations, forcing them seek safe and privacy-friendly alternatives for processing
personal data, and adjust their procedures to comply with the GDPR requirements.
Thus, the organizations tend to choose procedures and tools already tested and accepted
for the processing of personal data, to protect their privacy networks and PII, to align
with the increased usage of information and communication technologies.
Therefore, GDPR compliant seals have been of big relevance, since, in one hand we have
the organizations that process personal data, that try to be as prepared as they can for
this regulation, and with that, they look for solutions that ensures compatibility with
the regulation. On the other hand, we have software suppliers that see this regulation
as a business opportunity and bet on systems that guarantee to be GDPR compliant.
However, since the GDPR tunes the way the data is processed, and it is independent of
the support or the degree of automation of the system, we do not believe that privacy
seals are the proper way to show systems GDPR compliant. Nevertheless, as the ISs
are very relevant in the elaboration of DPIAs, and the right implemented measures
can minimize the risk of impact on personal data, this is also referenced in the GDPR,
where defines that technological measures should be applied in the systems, like the
data encryption and the recording of the access logs[Art. 32.o] [19].
Thus, since the ISs that support the processing must also have a bearing on the risks
involved in data processing and its impact on the privacy of individuals, the software
must be secure. Consequently, these, too, must undergo a process of risk analysis and
privacy impact assessment, which will then be weighed along with the privacy impact
assessments of the treatments. So, combining privacy impact assessment of the data
processing with the privacy impact assessment of the systems that are used during the
processing, we obtain a grade of how compatible we are with GDPR.
4.2 Proposal of DPIA for Information Systems
In order to prepare the evaluation proposal, a survey of the questionnaires already
proposed was carried out, being, in this case, the questionnaire from Microsoft [34],
the Spanish Data Protection Authority (AGPD - Agencia Española de Protección de
Datos) [8] and the Frensh Data Protection Authority (CNIL - Commission Nationale
de l’Informatique et des Libertés) [16]. Finally, to ensure that the evaluation covers
the essential points of a secure system, a mapping of GDPR with ISO 27001 was, also,
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carried out.
It is important to notice that the risk and the impact of the failure of an IS is totally
related with the kind of personal information that the IS processes. Therefore, in order
to assess the risk, we must (i) identify the potential effect (illegitimate access to data;
unwanted modification of data; temporary or definitive unavailability of data); (ii)
identify the sources risk; (iii) identify the possible threats; (iv) determine the existing
or planed measures; and (v) assess the severity and likelihood.
4.2.1 Mapping of ISO 27001 in GDPR
Privacy has largely been a matter of law and policy, traditionally working along
a spectrum that’s context dependent, while security has largely been a matter of
technology and policy, traditionally working in binary states. However, with GDPR,
“adequate security” is now mandatory by law. With these complex pieces of legislation,
there is a emerging class of technologies to help privacy teams understand and comply
with them operationally [23, 39].
Increasingly, this means that more than ever the security of technologies supports
privacy, with the idea of data protection [23, 39].
GDPR focuses specifically on the protecting and appropriately managing personal
data. ISO 27001 focuses more broadly on creating an information security management
system (ISMS) to prevent data loss or ex-filtration and ensure that a institution’s
information security posture can be maintained, and incidents identified, logged and
reported. This includes guidance on how to handle and protect personal data in a
secure, trustworthy manner [23, 39].
In Article 32, the GDPR states that organizations ". . . shall implement appropriate
technical and organizational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the
risk. . . " [19], it also mandates other security-related points [23, 39].
For the elaboration of the semiautomatic privacy assessment, a mapping of ISO 27001
with GDPR was made, identifying which points of the ISO 27001 were referenced in
GDPR. At first sight, we can notice that here are eight specific areas where ISO 27001
directly supports GDPR compliance, as demonstrated in the table 4.1 [23, 26, 39].
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GDPR “. . . lays down rules
relating to the protection of
natural persons with regard to
the processing of personal data
and rules relating to the free
movement of personal data”. [
Art. 1]
ISO 27001 mandates the
organizations “to ensure that
information receives an
appropriate level of protection in
accordance with the importance
to the organization”, so personal
data should be considered as






GDPR stipulates that businesses
that “. . . processing by a
processor shall be governed by a
contract or other legal act. . . ”.
[Art. 28]
ISO 27001 mandates the
organizations “to ensure
protection of the organization’s
assets that is accessible by
suppliers”. ISO mandates the
organizations “to maintain an
agreed level of information
security and service delivery in









GDPR mandates that controllers
to maintain a record of
processing activities under its
responsibility. GDPR mandates
to create “. . . a process for
regularly testing, assessing and
evaluating the effectiveness of
technical and organizational
measures for ensuring the
security of the processing”. [Arts.
30, 32]
ISO 27001 mandates the
organizations to have the
processing documented, with the
implemented controls. Those
documents should, after, be
updated and audited. [7.5]
Continued on next page
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GDPR mandates that the
organizations must implement
the appropriate technical and
organizational measures to
ensure a level of security
appropriate “. . . to ensure the
ongoing confidentiality, integrity,
availability and resilience of
processing systems and services”.
[Art. 32]
ISO 27001 mandates the
organizations “to ensure that
information security is an






assessments to ensure they’ve
identified major risks to EU
citizens’ personal data. [Art. 32]






GDPR advises the organizations
to implement measures to
mitigate the risks, such as
encryption. [Art. 32]
ISO 27001 mandates the
organizations “to ensure proper
and effective use of cryptography









“. . . the ability to restore the
availability and access to
personal data in a timely manner
in the event of a physical or
technical incident”. [Art. 32]
ISO 27001 mandates the
organizations “to protect against





authorities within 72 hours of
when a breach involving personal
data is discovered. If the risk to
them is sufficient then data
subjects should also be notified.
[Arts. 33, 34]
ISO 27001 mandates the
organizations “to ensure a
consistent and effective approach
to the management of
information security incidents,
including communication on
security events and weakness”.
[A.16.1]
CHAPTER 4. PROPOSAL OF DPIAS FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS 47
A more thorough analysis of the ISO mapping in GDPR can be found at Mapping
ISO 23445 in GDPR or in the next url: http://www.alunos.dcc.fc.up.pt/
~up201206845/Mapping.pdf, where an analysis is made of which controls of ISO
27001 are applied to each paragraph of the GDPR. However, the controls A.18.1.4 and
A.18.2.2 of ISO 27001 are not considered as they define that applicable regulations and
policies implemented should be followed, and the Clause 4 for the fact that organizations
must guarantee that the scope encloses all phases of the treatment of the personal
data, which applies for the entire Regulation.
4.2.2 DPIAs Structure
The Information Systems DPIA is composed by two risk assessment questionnaires. On
the one hand, there is a form assessing how the organization is technically secured and
privacy friendly, like workstations or physical security. On the other hand, the second
questionnaire assesses how a specific IS is technically secured and privacy friendly, like
the configuration of the server or website, the software development or how the data
processors are managed. The rest of the sections bellow identified applies to both of
surveys.
Consequently, with the inputs given by CNIL, AEPD and ISO 27001, we concluded
that in order to consistently assess an IS on the level of security and data protection,
the following points should be included in the assessment:
Identification and authentication
This group assesses how the users are created and managed, in order to ensure that the
user only access the data that he/she needs, he/she must be associated with a unique
identifier and must authenticate himself/herself before any access to personal data.
Access management
In this group, we assess how the users created in the previous group are managed, if
the access is limited to only allow access to data that the user really needs.
Access logs and data breaches management
In this section, the access log and management of incident procedures allowing to
react in the event of data breach (breach of confidentiality, integrity or availability)
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are assessed. These mechanisms help identify fraudulent access or abusive use of
personal data, or to determine the source of an incident. Thus, incident recording and
management measures must be implemented, recording relevant logs, and ensuring
that these logs cannot be changed.
Workstation
This group assess how well the organization is prepared to prevent fraudulent access,
virus execution, or remote control, since the risks of ISs intrusion are significant and
workstations are key points of entry.
Mobile data processing
With the increasing use of laptops, pen drives and smartphones, it becomes necessary
to be prepared for data breach after theft or loss of such equipment. With this group,
it is intended to anticipate data breach after the theft or loss of a mobile device,
evaluating the measures implemented to ensure the CIA of the personal data.
Internal network
This group evaluates the security measures implemented in the internal network, such
as what is allowed in the internal network, since only the network functions necessary
for the implemented processing must be authorized.
Servers
Server security should be a priority because they centralize a large amount of data.
Thus, this group strengthens the security measures applied to the servers, in order to
protect personal data.
Website
This group aims to ensure that the best basic practices are applied to sites, for example,
each site must guarantee the CIA the information it sends or collects.
Business continuity
A business continuity plan that anticipates possible incidents (for example, hardware
failure) should be prepared. Thus, this group evaluates how regular backups are
performed to reduce the effect of undesired data loss and how and when backup copies
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should be made and tested.
Archive
Archived data are those that are no longer used periodically but have not yet reached
the end of the data retention period, for example because they are held for use in case
of litigation. Thus, this group aims to evaluate how files are protected, especially if
archived data is special data that can have serious impacts on data subjects.
Supervising maintenance and data destruction
This group evaluates the measures implemented to ensure data security at all times in
the hardware and software life cycle. Thus, maintenance operations must be supervised,
such as data access control by service providers. And, at the end of the contract with
the service providers, the data should be deleted before discarding the hardware [14].
Data processors management
The GDPR argues that the data processing should be supervised by the controller,
including the security measures implemented. Thus, personal data communicated or
managed by subcontractors must be processed with security guarantees, which must
be defined by the controller. This group evaluates how the organization is ensuring
GDPR compliance by its processors [14].
Shares and transfers
This group aims to assess the security of all transfers and sharing of personal data.
Evaluating, for example, what medium is used to transmit personal data (such as
electronic mail services that are not a secure means of communication without additional
measures - message encryption). A simple manipulation error can result in the disclosure
of personal data to unauthorized recipients and therefore interferes with people’s right
to privacy. In addition, any entity with access to the messaging servers in question
(especially the senders and recipients) may have access to its content [14].
Physical security
This group aims to assess the security of facilities hosting IT servers and network
equipment, which must be protected so that access to facilities is controlled to prevent
or slow down unauthorized access. These measures should be applied to paper files or
IT equipment, especially servers [14].
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Software development
This group is based on privacy by design and privacy by default. Thus, it assesses if
the security and privacy was integrated as soon as possible in the projects. Defending
that privacy must be integrated with software development from the different stages of
the project in order to give data subjects better control over their data and to limit
errors, losses, unauthorized modifications or misuse of personal data in applications [14].
Confidentiality, integrity and quality of data
Two of the key concepts of information security are the confidentiality and integrity
assurance of information. Thus, measures should be defined for the confidentiality and
integrity to be safeguarded, such as hash functions to ensure data integrity, digital
signatures, which, in addition to ensuring integrity, are also capable of verifying the
origin of the information and its authenticity, and finally, the encryption that allows to
guarantee the confidentiality of a message. Therefore, in this group we evaluate the
mechanisms implemented to guarantee this concept [14].
Audit and responsibility
One of the major obstacles to data security and privacy is how users treat and apply
the defined procedures. Thus, in this group we evaluate how the organization makes
users aware of the privacy and security challenges of the organization and how internal
policies are transmitted [14].
Regarding the structure of the questionnaire, all questions are elaborated in such a
way that positive responses benefit (adding the value of the question) and negative
responses are not valued, increasing the risk. In the check boxes the worst-case scenario
is calculated, with the risk representing the worst case.
Since the DPO does not necessarily need to have technical skills, our estimate is that
most DPOs will have a legal background, so the questionnaire attempts to assist the
DPO in its GDPR compliance task, thus for each negative answer a suggestion for
improvement is made available, which is part of the final risk analysis report. In this
way the DPO does not need to know the technical characteristics of the ISs, it only
needs to ensure that the corrective measures are part of an action plan to be carried
out.
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4.3 Classification Methodology
The DPIA template has in total 221 questions, which are given an importance scale
rating of 4 (1: Not important to be present - 4: Essential to be present). However,
these questions are subdivided in two assessment questionnaires, one that is applied to
each IS, with 133 questions, and other applied to the policies and common procedures
within the organization, with the rest of the 89 questions.
Thus, to carry out the risk analysis, seven raters were asked to evaluate the questions
according to their experience the different parameters in the various mechanisms. For
the selection of raters, their experience and diversity in the scope of activities were
taken into account, and then selected according to convenience. Thus, the raters
experience are: one MSc student, two PhD student, one Assistant Professor with more
than 10 years’ experience, one Associate Professor with more than 20 years’ experience,
one security expert with more than 10 years’ experience, and one system administrator
with more than 10 years’ experience.
4.3.1 Personal Data as Variable
It should be noted that the level of risk is also calculated taking into account the
data that the IS supports, so if the IS contains sensitive data the risk generated in
the privacy impact assessment is higher than in a system that contains only common
data. Thus, the assessment contains a pre-definition of the IS that qualifies the IS
between three levels according with the information held in the IS. Although, GDPR
only distinguish between special data and non-special data, we believe, like AEPD,
that there should be an intermediate level of data protection, as some data such as
administrative and criminal convictions and infractions, capital and credit solvency,
location or movements, may not be sensitive information, but combined with other
data, or even if the data results in something specific, can become discriminatory.
Thus, the following segregation is proposed:
Low level
All ISs should adopt a minimal security measures, in this level all the personal data is
enclosed.
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Middle level
To the ISs that processes data that might become discriminatory, but usually is not
(like data related to administrative or criminal infractions, equity and credit solvency,
location or movements) should be required to adopt more security and privacy friendly
measures.
High Level
Finally, for the ISs that processes special data (racial or ethnic origin, political opinions,
religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing
of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural
person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual
orientation) and the data that gives rise to a Data Protection Impact Assessment
(DPIA) (video surveillance in public places and profiling) the security and privacy
requirements should be even more demanding.
4.3.2 Agreement Analysis
In this subsection we evaluate the agreement among the raters regarding importance
of the questions to ensure the privacy of personal data in information systems.
Methods
Interobserver agreement among experts was assessed using the proportions of agreement
(PA) [22]. R software (‘obs. agree’ package) was, again, used to compute the PA.
Ninety-five percent confidence intervals (95%CI) were calculated [22]. We present the
agreement among observers in Table 4.2. From the results we can conclude that the
agreement among observers is very low. This shows that the definition of the most
important tools for guaranteeing data protection is not consensual. To overcome the
lack of agreement the median of raters was considered as the best approach to define
the value in the questions on the SIs’ DPIA. In relation to observers, there were three
observers, who among them had an agreement above 50%, varying between 50% and
66%, which are those that work more directly with data protection, which shows that
although the agreement is still not ideal, the valuation of quotations by observers is
very dependent on their contact with this matter and that this type of risk analysis
should be studied and standardized.
In addition, it has also been found that if the scale only differentiate the important of
not important, has a scale of 2 instead of 4, than the agreement highers significantly,
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as showed in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Agreement between observers on the importance of
questions SIs’ DPIA.
PA [95% CI]
Scale with 4 levels 0.39 [0.37,0.41]
Scale with 2 levels 0.71 [0.69,0.74]
PA = Proportion of Agreement;
95% CI = 95% Confidence Interval
A study of interobserver agreement among experts was, also, assessed per section,
where a lack of agreement is uniform between all sections. We present the agreement
among observers in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: Agreement between observers on the importance of questions
SIs’ DPIA per section.
PA [95% CI]
Identification and authentication 0.35 [0.30,0.42]
Access management 0.43 [0.35,0.52]
Access logs and data breaches management 0.36 [0.31,0.42]
Workstation 0.38 [0.31,0.46]
Mobile data processing 0.34 [0.28,0.41]
Internal network 0.42 [0.33,0.54]
Servers 0.45 [0.37,0.54]
Website 0.32 [0.26,0.43]
Business continuity 0.36 [0.32,0.51]
Archive 0.36 [0.27,0.50]
Supervising maintenance and data destruction 0.44 [0.36,0.53]
Data processors management 0.33 [0.27,0.37]
Shares and transfers 0.43 [0.30,0.56]
Physical security 0.38 [0.31,0.43]
Software development 0.40 [0.32,0.45]
Confidentiality, integrity and quality of data 0.39 [0.30,0.50]
Audit and responsibility 0.38 [0.33,0.43]
PA = Proportion of Agreement;
95% CI = 95% Confidence Interval
Chapter 5
ISs’ DPIA’ Evaluation in
Organizational Environment
5.1 Implementation
In order to, initially, assess our proposal an environment for testing was implemented.
Thus, a virtual machine was configured in order to install the LimeSurvey platform [21],
so that as the DPIA was answered by the organizations, they received automatic
feedback on the state of the IS and its recommendations.
The LimeSurvey platform offered, direct or indirectly, all the tools needed to prepare
the questionnaire, such as multiple-choice questions, yes/no, check-boxes. And allowing
the quotation of the questions from the logical ability of the questions, printing
recommendations from the ability to text display, as well as drawing risk graphs by
inserting html code in the same type of question (text display).
However, for the elaboration of the DPIA as intended, the tool is not the most
facilitating, since after the questionnaire was accessible to fill, it does not allow
changing the structure of the questionnaire, adding options in check-boxes, removing
or adding questions. It is necessary to respond from the beginning to the questionnaire
whenever there is a need to make one of these changes. Also, the system should allow
different access levels like LimeSurvey platform does not have.
Currently, the ISs’ DPIA can be found on the TekPrivacy platform, which no longer
has the limitations found on the previous platform, which is still a work in progress,
but it is a platform specially though to the specificity of GDPR.
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5.2 Applying ISs’ DPIA in Organizational Environ-
ment
After defining of the information systems DPIA, it was important to evaluate it in
a real-world scenario and to evaluate its compliance with the GDPR. The following
institutions were studied: MP, GO Porto and APDL. This IS analysis allowed the
organizations to perform a more accurate risk analysis of the processing and to learn
where its efforts should be applied. And, on the other hand, it allowed us to improve
our risk analysis by identifying the biggest obstacles in the current market.
Although the organizations considered are public, that may cause some bias, there are
quite different in dimension, one of the organizations having 3 ISs, other 26 and the
last one 73.
In the table 5.1 we present some properties used to assess for the ISs for each
organization, note that, not all systems have the properties indicated below. When
the number of ISs with the property implemented is very similar with the number of
ISs without it, then it is considered as partially accomplished, Finally, might appear
the Not Applicable option, when the organization considers that the property is not
relevant to the ISs. The organizations in the table are not identified and were randomly
added to the table.
Table 5.1: Analysis of the mechanisms implemented in the
information systems of the organizations under study.
Question O1 O2 O3
There is a procedure for allocating, distributing, and storing passwords 3 3 3
Passwords validator prohibits the reuse of passwords 3 37 7
Authentication mechanisms are working correctly 7 3 3
Strong authentication mechanism is used 7 7 7
Appropriate measures for task delegations are created 7 3 7
Session data is validated 7 37 3
The session closes after some time of inactivity 3 7 3
Logout functions have been audited 3 7 3
The session generation method was audited 3 7 7
There is no possibility to deactivate the logs 3 - 7
Continued on next page
CHAPTER 5. ISS’ DPIA’ EVALUATION IN ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT56
Table 5.1 – continued from previous page
Question O1 O2 O3
Monitoring is performed on access controls of third parties 7 7 7
Personal data stored on off-site treatment is expressly authorized 3 3 -
The level of security corresponds to the type of system treated 3 - -
The relationships between the BDs are performed by internal identifiers 3 3 3
Backup procedures are reflected in the security policy 3 3 -
The backups ensure the reconstruction of the data to the state they
were in before the loss or destruction occurred
3 3 -
Measures are taken to prevent retrieval of personal data discarded 3 3 -
Discarded data or documents are removed from inventory 3 7 -
Temporary files/copies meet the corresponding security level 7 - 3
Temporary files were destroyed/deleted when they were no longer needed 3 - 7
The transfer of data is made safely (guarantees CIA) 7 37 -
Data or documents entry and exit is recorded 7 7 7
The code is peer reviewed 7 7 7
Break the Glass mechanisms are implemented 7 7 7
Pseudonymization and/or anonymization algorithms are implemented 7 7 7
The information contained in the data or document is classified 7 3 7
There is an updated inventory of the data / fields stored 3 37 3
Some personal data is encrypted 3 7 7
Cryptographic keys are changed frequently 3 - 7
Audit activity encompasses all servers and layers 3 3 -
The corrective measures proposed by previous audits were implemented 3 - -
The corrective measures of the audits were effective 3 - -
Internal vulnerability and threat tests are scheduled 3 7 -
O1 = Organization 1;
O2 = Organization 2;




- = Not Applicable
With this survey we observed that, although the organizations already considered the
security of their ISs, they did not have in mind privacy issues. Also, the procedures
are defined and are being applied, but most of them are not documented. Still in the
scope of the policies, we also observed that although some policies are defined and
documented, some of the ISs do not meet the defined requirements, in part because
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these characteristics should be implemented from the supplier and were not considered
by design.
Most systems only use password as an authentication mechanism, which is a bad
practice, due to repetitions, reuses and standardization of passwords. And the
organizations do not control the access of third parties (service providers) during
the monitoring of the ISs.
The sections with lower risk, so the sections more compliant with GDPR, are the
Business continuity, Identification and authentication and Physical security. The first
one, because most organizations try to be prepared in case of incident and are already
structured to perform good backup procedures. The Identification and authentication
has been discussed for some time, even though it is constantly improving, organizations
are aware of the best practices of identification and authentication. Finally, Physical
security is a subject studied for some time with well-defined procedures of conditions
of the data centers and access control to these rooms.
On the other hand, the sections Audit and responsibility, Software development and
Confidentiality, integrity and quality of data are below the expected, because are they
are more related to privacy and security, a new concern of the organizations. In first
place, we have auditability and responsibility that, although ISs have access logs, they
are not verified and are not audited in order to guarantee their quality and relevance,
nor is it common practice to test for vulnerabilities and threats to ISs. Another major
problem encountered is the development of software, which although is very advanced,
it did not consider concepts such as privacy by design and privacy by default. Lastly,
Confidentiality, integrity and quality of data, to which the usability-security relationship
is very important, it is necessary to carry out a study on what measures to implement
to guarantee confidentiality and integrity, for example, under what conditions the data
must be encrypted and signed, once whereas these measures have a very high impact
on the organization’s.
5.3 Assessment of the Proposed DPIA
The record of processing activities, defined in GDPR at Article 30, must document
how the processing activities is lead. Therefore, the security measures undertaken and
the ISs that gives support to the processing is important in the risk analyses and, if
necessary, in DPIAs. Given that several processing activities can share the same IS, we
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concluded that the IS should be assessed independently of the DPIA. By doing this,
one can evaluate the risk of each processing activity and just add the results for the
supporting IS.
Furthermore, the isolation of the risk assessment of the IS, also permits the organization
to identify which IS needs more attention, because supports more processing activities,
or the processing activities that the IS supports are sensible, or because is the IS with
less security measures or downgraded.
Besides, the ISs’ DPIA considering privacy and security issues of the system and is
completed by the technical team, leaving to the responsible the characterization on
how the processing is made and how the data subjects can execute their rights. This
aspect, also, made us think that, maybe, the legal aspects should also have an isolated
risk assessment, like exemplified in figure 5.3, but this assessment has not yet been
developed.
Figure 5.1: Processing characterization and compliance assessment
One of the main difficulties encountered in the elaboration of the assessment ques-
tionnaire was the definition of the number of questions, since it becomes a trade-off
between usability and utility. For the evaluation be consistent, it is necessary to have
a significant number of questions. On the other hand, if the assessment has many
questions, then it becomes tiresome and of low usability.
The problem of the DPIA per IS with many questions was made worse by the fact that
CHAPTER 5. ISS’ DPIA’ EVALUATION IN ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT59
the organization needed to answer to a questionnaire by IS and some of the answers to
the questions were the same among the ISs.
In order to reduce the number of questions to be answered for each IS, the original
questionnaire was divided in two, depending on whether the question was related to
the organization’s security and privacy principles (independent of the IS), or whether
the question was related to a specificity or characteristic of the IS.
Another problem encountered in risk analysis is the diversity of application. Since
there are several ISs with different requirements and different applications, it was
necessary to make the questions abstract enough so that each system specification
could be overcome by the questions, but on the other hand it would allow us to assess
in a specific way the criterion that we searched for, being that in some questions the
only solution found was to give the permission of "not applicable". The fact that we
open the door to the "not applicable" raised another problem, since professionals often,
when the answer is negative tended to classify it as "not applicable".
However, since this evaluation must be adapted to the reality of the organizations, this
is a work in progress model, which is being improved as it is applied in practice, that
is, organizations are completing the risk assessment for their ISs. This improvement
may involve, for example, the adjustment of the questions, as well as the re-evaluation
of the evaluation of the questions.
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
As in all risk evaluation, risk analysis for the protection of personal data must have a
balance between functionality (complies with GDPR requirements), usability (easy and
quick to use) and security (do what is expected and nothing more). Thus, all procedures,
methods, mechanisms and tools chosen for data processing must be evaluated and
their risk should be weighed, so a trade-off from where the organization wants to
prioritize must be performed. In this work, we aimed to facilitate the risk analysis and
its evaluation for consent acquisition and for the ISs that support the processing.
6.1 Research Summary
As noticed, the mechanisms with greater levels of security are those that have a valid
signature according to the environment of consent. If printed paper is used, then
a normal signature guarantees the identity of the person. In the case of a digital
reality, the signature needs to be digital, using a qualified electronic certificate. So, the
only mechanisms identified that are considered as trusted and guarantees a level of
compliance as defined by GDPR are the ones that most minimize the universe of data
subjects, thus limiting the scope of processing operations. Contrariwise, the methods
confirmation button of the consent by email and submission of a document proving
identity are the ones with lower levels of trustworthiness. Nevertheless, the mechanism
that requires less actions from data subjects, the Confirmation Button by email, is, as
expected, the one with higher usability. But this easiness, causes a lack of confidence
in the mechanism. In the opposite case, the method with lower usability is the Paper
Signed in Person.
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Some common weaknesses and strengths were found in the organizations evaluated. As
indicated in the previous chapter, the sections best prepared to ensure the security and
protection of personal data are Business continuity, Identification and authentication
and Physical security, mainly because they are part of the principles to be taken into
account for the continuity and execution of the business, and for that reason already
well-known and practiced care. On the other hand, the less prepared sections are Audit
and responsibility, Software development and Confidentiality, integrity and quality of
data, which in turn ensure security, privacy and data protection that is a new concern
of organizations due to the computer attacks that have occurred and due to GDPR. In
any case, few systems are prepared for these factors and organizations with procedures
that guarantee security and data protection.
Similar to the idea of the AEPD - Evaluates, the ISs’ DPIA attempts to assess data
security and privacy conditions, but only those that are stored in ISs, since this
semiautomatic risk analysis evaluates ISs privacy issues and not information security.
However, unlike the CNIL platform, this evaluation is more closed, trying to facilitate
the work to the controllers, evaluating the risk from the yes / no answers. It also tries
to segregate the evaluation areas so that each analysis is performed by a technician
and the common processes, so they do not need to be evaluated for each treatment,
although it is still a work in progress.
6.2 Current Limitations
As in several other parameters in the risk analysis, the consent method implemented
should also depend on the sensitivity of the personal data involved in the processing
operations. There is no single universal accepted method, as the trade-off between the
several parameters introduced in the GDPR is quite diverse. Notice that the GDPR
reinforces the risk analysis and that the institutions should measure the risk and either
mitigate it or accept it. We stress that in an online environment the notion of freely
given is really hard to assure as we are not able to see the consent expression, this is
similar to the online voting where the freely given is also a key aspect [30].
In the study of the definition of an ISs’ DPIA, we found that privacy and protection of
personal data are novel, since most systems in production did not take into account
privacy by design and privacy by default. Thus, most ISs are not prepared to ensure
the protection of personal data, and the measures that can be taken at this time are
of great importance to organizations, both procedural and financially, since it would
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be necessary to implement new tools in the system and this correction can lead to a
decrease in productivity. Moreover, the ISs’ DPIA was only tested in 3 organizations,
with the 3 organizations being public, so it is necessary that the risk analysis be
evaluated in a larger and more varied sample of organizations.
Other limitation of the analysis is the low agreement between observers, demonstrat-
ing that there should be more debated and consensual issue, in order to facilitate
organizations when choosing the best practices to ensure compliance with the GDPR.
6.3 Future Work
As future work we have two different lines of research, these being at the level of the
request for consent, and the isolated risk analyzes.
So, for future work, we plan to evaluate the agreement between the raters by using
proportions of agreement. This will be particular useful to validate the risk rating that
we are proposing. The risk rating, which was statistically validated in this work, will
hopefully play a crucial role in the Data Protection Impact Assessments. Regarding
consent, we believe that it is urgent to develop a usable zero-knowledge protocol to
fulfill the data minimization requirement.
For future work of ISs’ DPIA we plan to continually improve as we have more IS to
analyze and study the reality of organizations. In addition, we also intend to create
more segregated risk analyzes, so we need to check what common points have all
the processing and when does this segregation benefit the organization in terms of
availability of costs and resources. As previously indicated, for this work, we are
already thinking of separating the legal contents of the remaining analysis, since, it
has to allocate a specialized professional to carry out this analysis.
6.4 Conclusion
In conclusion, although the regulation has been in place since May 25, 2018, the GDPR
adaptation activity still requires substantial additional work. Security and privacy
are far below the technologies currently used. Thus, there are neither mechanisms
for collecting consent that fulfills the requirements imposed by regulators in a usable
way, nor the ISs that handle the information does not have the protection and security
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mechanisms expected. The problem goes beyond technical failures when there is no
harmony on the impact that each consent mechanism has on a person’s privacy and on
the degree of importance of the characteristics in ISs. This is even more evident in
today’s processing model of personal data being used.
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